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I. Introduction: other worlds
In August 1835, the New York Sun published a serialized account of John Herschel’s
lunar discoveries, supposedly written by his assistant, ‘Dr. Andrew Grant’. Herschel the
younger had, the Sun claimed, developed ‘a telescope of vast dimensions and an
entirely new principle’ which allowed him to examine the moon at a previously
unknown magniﬁcation. There, the account continued, he was able to observe ﬂora
and fauna in tremendous detail, including the behaviour of human-like though
unreﬁned creatures: ‘We scientiﬁcally denominated them as Vespertilio-homo, or
man-bat; and they are doubtless innocent and happy creatures, notwithstanding that
some of their amusements would but ill comport with our terrestrial notions of
decorum’ (Figure 1).
1
Subsequent observations revealed architecture, evidence of
civilization and even religion, which invited interpretation and conjecture:
Had the devotees of these temples gone the way of all living, or were the latter merely
historical monuments? What did the ingenious builders mean by the globe surrounded
by ﬂames? Did they by this record any past calamity of their world, or predict any future
one of ours?
2
The excited response of many readers of these articles has led to the six New York Sun
articles’ classiﬁcation as a hoax, but Michael J. Crowe claims that Richard Adams
Locke, their author, intended them to be parodic of the more fanciful turns of
astronomical speculation.
3
They certainly incorporate important aspects of the
plurality-of-worlds debate in the nineteenth century; there is the issue of scopic power
and with it the expectation that a new generation of telescope would reveal new levels
of visual detail, perhaps providing evidence of civilization and history on other
planets. The want of ‘decorum’ among the bat-men, here alarming a fastidious and
imaginary astronomer for comic effect, reﬂects anxieties about the propriety of even
imagining alternate forms of life on other planets – a problem that intensiﬁed as one
considered the possibility of human-like beings and their higher faculties. The lunar
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monuments described in the passage above indicate not only indigenous culture and
intelligence, but also, the author speculates, an awareness of future terrestrial history.
Uncertainty as to whether the enﬂamed globe represents another world’s past or
Earth’s fate not only suggests that different celestial bodies may possess variations of a
common history, but also untethers celestial history from a single chronological
sequence and problematizes a narrative of human progress: either these lunar beings
have the gift of prophecy, or the entire history of human civilization (including our
planet’s apocalyptic ending) has in some sense already happened.
This article examines the cultural and intellectual interaction between optical
technologies and historical concepts in the plurality-of-worlds debate in the
nineteenth century. The enhanced powers of the telescope and spectroscope, described
by Richard A. Proctor in 1870 as ‘light-gatherer’ and ‘light-sifter’ respectively,
encouraged claims that Earth did not possess a singular and special status in the
history of creation and speculation as to the existence and character of our fellow
beings in the universe.
4
My claim is that in addition to the fanciful speculations of
astronomers who imagined beings and worlds beyond the limited capacities of their
instruments, there was another stage of these conjectures, which was to imagine the
history of other worlds. This imaginative step allowed new reﬂections on history itself,
and the concept of plurality was inﬂected by, and became an expression of, different
historiographical stances during the nineteenth century.
Pluralist speculation was both a marginal branch of astronomy (in relation to the
more empirical study of positional astronomy), and a popular one (texts on plurality
ran to multiple editions). It also served as a porous ﬁeld between scientiﬁc and wider,
metaphysical cultures of enquiry; Thomas De Quincey commented on the nebular
debate in 1846 and his response to the alleged discoveries of Lord Rosse’s telescope was
notable for its departures from scientiﬁc caution and his use of fantastical literary
Figure 1. ‘Ruby Amphitheater’ from the New York Sun (28 August 1835), anon.
4. Richard A. Proctor, Other Worlds Than Ours, 3rd ed. (London: Longmans, Green, 1872),
p. 37 (original emphasis).
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imagery to explore the signiﬁcance of an astronomical discovery. The mid-century
phase of the debate, before spectrum analysis had closed down the nebular
controversy, was the period when arguments for and against plurality were tied up
with a host of other discussions. These included the composition and dynamics of
nebulae, the limits to analogical and inductive reasoning, and the question of how
other academic disciplines – geology, biology and even history – might interact with
astronomical knowledge. William Whewell (then president of the British Association
for the Advancement of Science) and David Brewster argued respectively against and
for plurality in two high-circulation and repeatedly reprinted texts: Of the Plurality of
Worlds: An Essay (1853) and More Worlds than One: The Creed of the Philosopher and
the Hope of the Christian (1854).
5
My analysis of nebular controversies focusses on the
articulation of various disciplinary questions that the imagination of unseen worlds
provoked.
The section titled ‘Astral projection’ will show how, by the 1870s and 1880s, the
evidence of spectrum analysis had indicated that other worlds were likely to be
composed of similar materials to our own and the conception of other worlds as
counterparts of Earth was taken up by astronomers and writers of ﬁction alike.
6
The
tendency of the pluralist astronomical imagination was to undermine a geocentric
view of the universe; also, the recognition of light as historical information, travelling
through the universe at a ﬁnite speed, made it possible to imagine multiple observers
in space, receiving each other’s histories as light transmissions.
7
Astronomers’
imaginative self-projections into the cosmos rendered space as an interplanetary and
historical web of telescopic gazes. This phase in plurality, in which enhanced optical
technologies invigorated astronomical speculation, exempliﬁes how advances in
instrumentation did not necessarily assist the general rise of scientiﬁc objectivity that
Lorraine Daston and Galison describe.
8
The ﬁnal section will examine how the anti-providentialist historiography of
Louis Auguste Blanqui’s astronomical hypothesisof 1872, as well as the astral ﬁgures
that appear in Friedrich Nietzsche’s second meditation on the use of history, used
the concept of plurality to critique the cultural complacency of equating history
5. Whewell’s Of the Plurality of Worlds was ﬁrst published in 1853 and had run to a third
edition within a year; Brewster’sMore Worlds than One appeared in 1854 in response, and
was still being republished in a new, illustrated edition in 1876.
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with progress. This article does not wish to argue against the established account
of nineteenth-century intellectual history as a process of disciplinary formation –
which for historical thought involved its transformation from a romantic to a
scientiﬁc ﬁeld of study.
9
It does show, however, that by making light the signature of
celestial composition (as spectral analysis afﬁrmed), and of universal history (as the
transmission of the past through space), scientiﬁc analysis enabled philosophical
critiques of human singularity in the cosmos; and these critiques invoked plurality
in order to do so. Blanqui’s historiographical declaration ‘there’s no progress!’ is, he
tells us, ‘just a simple conclusion based on spectral analysis and Laplace’s
cosmogony’.
10
History may have become an increasingly scientiﬁc and positivist
discipline by the end of the century, as Jann and Dowling have shown;
11
but the
staging of multiple histories among the stars thanks to the information of the
telescope and spectroscope allowed critics such as Blanqui and Nietzsche to turn an
empirical model of knowledge as steadily additive and accumulative against itself.
Plurality served as a proposition that allowed the relations between disciplines to be
contested and rearticulated, and was one in which historical concepts were always
involved.
II. Nebulae and history: a ‘philosophical romance’
Thomas Chalmers’ inﬂuential contributions to the plurality debate included warnings
against unbridled cosmic speculation, and the anticipation of a time when optical
proof of other worlds would recast plurality from a speculative proposition to proven
knowledge. The inﬂuence of his A Series of Discourses on the Christian Revelation:
Viewed in Connection with the Modern Astronomy (1817) is seen in the rapid
republication of his work (nine reprintings and 20,000 copies in 1817 alone) and in the
contemporary attention it drew.
12
The author of a 30-page response in the British
Review described Chalmers as ‘a ﬁxed star in that ﬁrmament of science, which he has
taught to shine with the radiance of the Gospel’ and Alexander Maxwell published a
full-length response to Chalmers in 1817.
13
Chalmers also established terms for the
debate which would be repeatedly referred to in the nineteenth century, for example
his distrust of the imaginative leaps that could be occasioned by analogical reasoning,
9. Rosemary Jann, The Art and Science of Victorian History (Columbus: Ohio State University
Press, 1985); Thomas William Heyck, The Transformation of Intellectual Life in Victorian
England, new ed. (Chicago, IL: LyceumBooks, 1989); Robin Gilmour,The Victorian Period:
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10. Auguste Blanqui, ‘Eternity According to the Stars’, trans. by Matthew H. Anderson, CR:
The New Centennial Review, 9 (2009), 3–60 (pp. 57, 58).
11. Jann, Art and Science; Linda Dowling, ‘Roman Decadence and Victorian Historiography’,
Victorian Studies, 28 (1985), 579–607.
12. Crowe, Extraterrestrial Life, p. 184.
13. William Roberts, ‘Review: A Series of Discourses on the Christian Revelation, Viewed in
Connection with the Modern Astronomy’, The British Review, and London Critical Journal,
10 (1817), 1–30 (p. 9); Alexander Maxwell, Plurality of Worlds: Or Letters, Notes and
Memoranda, Philosophical and Critical (London: A. Maxwell, 1817).
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and his turn to the microscope to counteract the vertiginous cosmic scale apprehended
by the telescope.
14
He also identiﬁed the troubling implications of plurality for the
Christian belief in God’s special care of mankind on Earth, and cited a passage from
the Psalms that would be requoted by Whewell, Brewster and Proctor:
When I consider thy heavens, the work of thy ﬁngers, the moon and the stars, which thou
hast ordained; What is man, that you art mindful of him? and the son of man, that thou
should visitest him?
15
Chalmers’ response to this anxiety was not to deny plurality on the basis of scriptural
orthodoxy. Instead, his argument was that correct scientiﬁc method would counteract
unwarranted speculations of the kind modern astronomy was seen to have
encouraged. Chalmers referred to the authority of science in order to protect the
Christian values of piety and humility, and simultaneously to safeguard the belief that
the creator extended a special care to mankind. The object of the questions (on the
nature of ‘man’ and ‘the son of man’) must, in this context, refer to their contested
singularity in the universe.
The Second Discourse, ‘The Modesty of True Science’, began with praise for
Newton’s steadfast empiricism by which no theory is accepted without evidence.
‘All the sublime truths of modern astronomy lie within the ﬁeld of actual observation’
he wrote, ‘and have the ﬁrm evidence to rest upon of all that information which is
conveyed to us by the avenue of the senses.’
16
As the title of the discourse implied,
science was divided into the true and the false. Newtonian empiricism was
championed, and contrasted with that which is not properly science at all, rather a
form of conjectural reasoning which sought to make claims about what could not be
directly observed. Chalmers castigated thinkers who ‘have winged their audacious way
into forbidden regions – and . . . have crossed that circle by which the ﬁeld of
observation is enclosed – and there have . . . debated and dogmatised with all the
pride of a most intolerant assurance’.
17
Plurality in the nineteenth century stimulated
consideration of science’s limits and propriety; the rejection here of conjecture derived
from analogy would ﬁnd an echo later when WilliamWhewell’s denial of plurality was
framed within the wider issue of the proper function of inductive reasoning in the
sciences.
18
Kant, in his Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens (1755),
exemplifying the approach deplored by Chalmers, inferred that ‘most planets are
certainly inhabited’, adding that ‘conjectures, in which analogy and observations agree
14. Psalm 8.3–4, quoted in: Thomas Chalmers, A Series of Discourses on the Christian
Revelation: Viewed in Connection with the Modern Astronomy, 8th ed. (Glasgow: John
Smith and Son, 1817), p. 53.
15. Chalmers, Series of Discourses, p. 17.
16. Chalmers, Series of Discourses, pp. 71–72.
17. Chalmers, Series of Discourses, p. 72.
18. William Whewell, ‘Modern Science-Inductive Philosophy (Review of J.F.W. Herschel’s
A Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy)’, The Quarterly Review, 45
(1831), 374–407.
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perfectly to support one another, have the same dignity as formal proofs’.
19
The object
of Chalmers’ attack was the mode of reasoning by analogy that concluded, from the
existence of life on the one planet of which we have empirical knowledge, that the same
must be true on others. Later in the century, Richard Proctor would be obliged to
defend plurality from the accusation that it relied upon such crude analogies whose
argument he summarized: ‘The earth is a planet, and Mars is a planet, therefore what
we know about the earth may be inferred respecting Mars, no account being taken of
the known difference in the conditions of the two planets.’
20
The movement from the
known to the unknown produced the invention of worlds, a process that had more in
common with literature than with proper scientiﬁc enquiry: Chalmers asked his
readers to imagine
that one of these philosophers made so extravagant a departure from the sobriety of
experimental science as to pass on from the astronomy of the different planets, and to
attempt the natural history of their animal and vegetable kingdoms. He might get hold of
some vague and general analogies, to throw an air of plausibility around his speculation.
He might pass from the botany of the different regions of the globe that we inhabit; and
make his loose and conﬁdent applications to each of the other planets, according to its
distance from the sun, and the inclination of its axis to the plane of its annual revolution;
and out of some such slender materials, he may work up an amusing philosophical
romance, full of ingenuity, and having, withal, the colour of truth and consistency spread
over it.
21
The type of enquiry he was alarmed by – and characterized as ‘romance’
(in opposition to ‘sobriety’) was one which projected the natural history of our own
planet onto other celestial bodies by means of analogy. The future capacity of optical
technologies to provide empirical evidence of other worlds was one he did not,
however, foreclose; he imagined a time when other worlds might become visible:
‘Perhaps some large city, the metropolis of a mighty empire, may expand into a visible
spot by the powers of some future telescope’ – an anticipation to which the Moon
Hoax would respond.
22
The reader was left in a curious position: awed by the wealth of
creation, prepared to countenance the existence of other divinely ordained worlds, but
prohibited from imagining their topography and indigenous life. Chalmers described
celestial speculation as an act of impossible hubris, using a ﬁgure that recalled Icarus
and foreshadowed Proctor’s and Flammarion’s celestial spirits: ‘He wings his fancy’ to
a ‘hazardous . . . region and vainly strives a penetrating vision through the mantle of
. . . an obscurity’.
23
Chalmers’ readers were not always able to follow his proscriptions;
the author of a British Review article endorsed the reconciliation of Christian faith with
19. Immanuel Kant, Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens, ed. by Stanley
L. Jaki (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1981), pp. 186, 107.
20. Richard A. Proctor, Our Place Among Inﬁnities. a Series of Essays Contrasting Our Little
Abode in Space and Time with the Inﬁnities Around Us (New York: D. Appleton, 1876),
pp. 48–49.
21. Chalmers, Series of Discourses, pp. 72–73.
22. Chalmers, Series of Discourses, p. 32.
23. Chalmers, Series of Discourses, p. 79.
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the telescope, but made hypotheses of his own about the theological implications of
other worlds and their histories: ‘The Bible intimates that the history of the
redemption of our species is known in other parts of the universe, and allows us to
conjecture that other worlds may be concerned in the mysterious virtue of the
atonement.’
24
In the same passage he even suggested the possibility of ‘unfallen worlds’.
Chalmers himself speculated that sin ‘may have spread its desolation over all the
planets of all the systems’ – before catching himself and declaring ‘here I stop – nor
shall I attempt to grope my dark and fatiguing way, by another inch, among such
sublime and mysterious secrecies’.
25
He was apparently susceptible to the same
temptations that he cautioned against.
26
Thomas De Quincey made no attempt to restrain his cosmic theological fancies.
In an extraordinary article, ‘System of the Heavens as Revealed by Lord Rosse’s
Telescopes’ (1846), he took the nebular controversy as the occasion to interrogate,
among other questions, the singularity of our human history in the universe.
27
J.P.
Nichol had cautiously reported Lord Rosse’s claim to have solved the nebular debate,
and De Quincey responded to the event in dramatic terms, announcing ‘a new era for
the human intellect’ in an essay published by Tait, as Nichol’s System of the World had
been.
28
The fanfare De Quincey sounded in response to this scientiﬁc discovery
reminds us of the signiﬁcance (and public impact) of the nebular debate, as Jonathan
Smith has shown.
29
The mystery of these indistinct areas of light in the sky concerned
the origins of the universe, and preoccupied advocates and deniers of the plurality of
worlds in the mid century. The relationship between plurality and nebulae was made
explicit by William Whewell who, after David Brewster’s vociferous response to his Of
the Plurality of Worlds, felt obliged to defend himself against Brewster’s accusation that
he subscribed to the ‘nebular hypothesis’ (an expression he himself coined in his
Bridgewater Treatise of 1833). In the Preface to the third edition of his work he wrote:
That the Nebulae are not in a state of progress towards becoming systems of worlds, is a
doctrine prominently asserted and argued for in the following Essay: that the Nebulae are
24. Roberts, ‘Review’, p. 15.
25. Chalmers, Series of Discourses, pp. 80–81.
26. David Brewster felt no such restraint and constructed an elaborate explanation of the
purpose of the other planets of our solar system – to accommodate the souls of all human
beings that had lived on earth until the day of judgement. David Brewster, More Worlds
Than One: The Creed of the Philosopher and the Hope of the Christian (London: John
Murray, 1862), p. 15.
27. The article was a response to the discoveries of Lord Rosse’s telescope as reported by John
Pringle Nichol, who had published the ﬁndings of the telescope in Thoughts on Some
Important Points Relating to the System of the World (Edinburgh: W. Tait, 1846). Grevel
Lindop reports that Nichol’s friendship with De Quincey extended to sheltering him in
the newly built Glasgow observatory to hide from his creditors in 1841, in The Opium-
Eater: A Life of Thomas De Quincey (London: J.M. Dent, 1981), p. 342.
28. Thomas De Quincey, ‘System of the Heavens as Revealed by Lord Rosse’s Telescopes’, Tait’s
Edinburgh Magazine, 13 (1846), 566–579 (p. 569).
29. Jonathan Smith, ‘De Quincey’s Revisions to “The System of the Heavens”’, Victorian
Periodicals Review, 26 (1993), 203–212.
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in such a state of progress, is commonly held in conjunction with the assertion of the
Plurality of Worlds.
30
The historical character of these remarks is clear: the repeated phrase, ‘state of
progress’, indicated development, and an understanding of planets’ life-cycles as
natural-historical phenomena.
We should then expect questions of plurality to attend Lord Rosse’s (premature
and incorrect) declaration that the debate was over. The largest telescope of its time
appeared to have penetrated the Orion Nebula and revealed that its milky, luminous
areas could be ‘resolved’ by his telescope into separate points of light – stars – at
tremendous and previously unimagined distances (Figure 2). De Quincey stated that
‘the theatre to which he has introduced us, is immeasurably beyond the old one which
he found’,
31
and cast Rosse in the role of an imperative demi-urge ‘that says to the
rebellious nebulae, – “Submit, and burst into blazing worlds!” that says to the gates of
darkness, –“Roll back, ye barriers, and no longer hide from us the inﬁnities of
God!”’
32
The revelation was curiously qualiﬁed however; ‘he revealed more by far than
he found’ De Quincey added in a telling aside that established the space for his own
‘discovery’.
33
When De Quincey contemplated the magniﬁed image of the Orion
Nebula, he recognized in it a terrifying ﬁgure from historical and literary antiquity:
You see a head thrown back, and raising its face, (or eyes, if eyes it had,) in the very
anguish of hatred, to some unknown heavens. What should be its skull wears what might
be an Assyrian tiara, only ending behind in a ﬂoating train . . . . Brutalities unspeakable
sit upon the upper lip, which is conﬂuent with a snout; for separate nostrils there are
none . . . . One is reminded by the phantom’s attitude of a passage, ever memorable in
Milton: that passage, I mean, where Death ﬁrst becomes aware, soon after the original
trespass, of his own future empire over man.
34
The act of resolving a distant nebula, made possible by enhanced telescopic power,
here projected the author’s reﬂections backwards in history, ﬁrst to antiquity then to
the literary-mythological: in the nebula he recognized an object of Egyptian statuary
from the British Museum, which then gave way to (or ‘resolved’ as) the ﬁgure of Death
in Milton’s Paradise Lost. The pursuit of the material origin of the universe has been
overlaid with another understanding of origin, as John Barrell explains: ‘It may be that
most primal scene of all, therefore, that De Quincey is ﬁguring in the form of the
original act of incest described in Paradise Lost’.
35
We should not overlook the two-way
temporality of the scene, however; as well as staging a primal mythological scene, this
ﬁgure of death anticipated the ‘future’ catastrophe of man’s fall, an anticipation which
30. William Whewell, Of the Plurality of Worlds: An Essay, Also a Dialogue On the Same
Subject, 5th ed (London: Parker, 1854), p. 329 (original emphasis).
31. De Quincey, ‘System of the Heavens’, p. 569 (my emphasis).
32. De Quincey, ‘System of the Heavens’, p. 570.
33. De Quincey, ‘System of the Heavens’, p. 569.
34. De Quincey, ‘System of the Heavens’, p. 571.
35. John Barrell, The Infection of Thomas De Quincey: A Psychopathology of Imperialism (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), p. 109.
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may recall the telescopic revelation of the moon hoax: the depiction of earth’s ﬁnal
destruction.
De Quincey’s visions did not constitute a direct intervention in the plurality
debate. They did, nonetheless, in intense prose, demonstrate the way that optical
instruments stripped the gazing self of its groundedness in the realm of the non-visual
senses, and facilitated the imagination of other beings in space. In the same essay, he
distinguished humanity from the animal kingdom of ‘brutes’, for whom ‘distance is
probably not revealed to them except by a presence, viz., by some shadow of their own
animality’.
36
The mind projected by a telescope into space was untethered by presence,
or proximity, as could be judged by the senses – with disorientation as a consequence.
When describing the ‘mystery of Space’, De Quincey wrote: ‘In reality the depths and
the heights which are in man, the depths by which he searches, the heights by which he
aspires, are but projected and made objective externally in the three dimensions of
Figure 2. ‘Nebula of Orion, ﬁgured by Sir J. Herschel’ John Pringle Nichol, Thoughts on Some
Important Points Relating to the System of the World (Edinburgh; London: John Johnstone,
1848), ﬁg. VIII.
36. De Quincey, ‘System of the Heavens’, p. 570 (original emphasis).
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space which are outside of him’.
37
Space had become a ‘theatre’ upon which the
phantasms of the interior and shadowy realms of the human mind could be staged;
and De Quincey’s vision was one which, unconstrained by the bodily sensation of
‘presence’, ﬂeshed out its phantom subject with lips and snout (those bodily faculties
which were stripped by optical technologies). For De Quincey, this fabulation of other
beings was an effect of optical experience (the monster was upside down), as when he
described the apparition (a shadow of the observer) produced by certain atmospheric
conditions at the Brocken peak in the Harz Mountains in ‘Suspiria de Profundis’
(1845). It was a ‘reﬂex of . . . inner nature’ which ‘sometimes swerves out of my orbit,
and mixes a little with alien natures’.
38
As with the Orion Nebula, a technologically
enhanced mode of seeing multiplied the self, making it an estranged lens-function
which produced ‘alien natures’.
The consequences of astronomy’s excursions into deep space for history were
twofold. The ﬁrst, for De Quincey, was that reﬂection upon the respective ages and
stages of planets’ life-cycles made it possible to imagine eternity as a process of
historical return, and Earth as ‘a Phoenix that is known to have secret processes for
rebuilding herself out of her own ashes’.
39
By adopting a model of time as cyclical and
endlessly-repeating (a seldom-observed instance of ‘eternal return’), De Quincey’s
vision of the nebula was a manner of expressing fear at a secularization of theological
concepts, as Alex Murray makes clear: ‘Cast free from [divine revelation] into a process
of endless reﬂection we end up with a horror of the phoenix, at the mercy of the
inﬁnite regresses of time and space, destined to repeat ad inﬁnitum the resurrection
without revelation’.
40
The second was another troubling transformation of theological
cosmology; by replacing the benevolent gaze of the creator with more purposeful
observation by other intelligences (which will later in the century be imagined as
‘intellects vast and cool and unsympathetic’
41
), the universe could be notionally
populated by other living beings in less or more advanced states of species and
civilizational development, and this hypothesis then drew upon astronomy, geology,
biology, evolutionary theory in various and contested conﬁgurations.
De Quincey’s idea of Earth’s cyclical history invoked unexpected afﬁnities with
geological science. He imagined Earth made unfamiliar by other topographies at
previous points in its history: ‘Where the south pole now shuts her frozen gates
inhospitably against the intrusions of ﬂesh, once were probably accumulated the ribs
of empires; man’s imperial forehead, woman’s roseate lips, gleamed upon ten thousand
hills’. We are also invited to think that ‘little England’ and her ‘sweet pastoral rivulets’
once contained ‘a regal Ganges, that drained some hyperbolical continent’.
42
37. Ibid.
38. Thomas De Quincey, ‘Suspiria de Profundis’, in Confessions of an English Opium-Eater and
Other Writings (London: Penguin Books, 2003), pp. 89–190 (p. 163).
39. De Quincey, ‘System of the Heavens’, p. 568.
40. Alex Murray, ‘Vestiges of the Phoenix: De Quincey, Kant and the Heavens’,
Victoriographies, 1 (2011), 243–260 (p. 254).
41. H.G. Wells, The War of the Worlds (London: Penguin, 2005), p. 1.
42. De Quincey, ‘System of the Heavens’, p. 568.
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The imagination of imperial capitals in the polar regions on a previous round of
terrestrial history may have been fanciful, but the imagination of England having had
dramatic phases of its natural history was less idiosyncratic: Charles Wycliffe Goodwin
suggested in 1860 that nature had not always been governable on the British Isles:
‘Grand, indeed, was the fauna of the British Islands in these early days. Tigers as large
again as the biggest Asiatic species lurked in the ancient thickets; elephants of nearly
twice the bulk of the largest individuals that now exist in Africa or Ceylon roamed in
herds.’
43
The discoveries of astronomy, like those of geology and biology, provoked
historical visions of other civilizations and animal life on the planet Earth, visions that
were amenable to projection onto other planets and into deep space. These sources
from the mid-nineteenth century are very different, but they both exhibit ways in
which biblical and mythological conceptions of the prehistoric past intermingled with
an increasingly material understanding of the planet, the universe and their origins.
It was clearly enticing to apply the geological evidence of much earlier ages to ideas
of the life of other planets. Richard Proctor captured the relationship of both to
plurality when he observed that ‘Astronomy and Geology owe much of their charm to
the fact that they suggest thoughts of other forms of life than those with which we are
familiar’; the spatial removes which astronomy sought to traverse were comparable
with the temporal remoteness of previous ages for the geologist; the ‘epochs when
those monsters throve and multiplied’ are almost interchangeable for the supposition
of life ‘upon other celestial bodies’.
44
The assertion of parallels between disciplines and
the extension of evidence from one to another varied from writer to writer.
De Quincey, Murray notes, found in the image of the phoenix a means of refuting an
idea of successive time that geology was seen to suggest.
45
Another equivalence
between scientiﬁc disciplines was drawn by Robert Chambers, whose Vestiges of the
Natural History of Creation was published anonymously in 1844, and assumed
plurality on the basis of evidence from the disciplines of biology and geology – and
proceeded in precisely the direction that Thomas Chalmers had prohibited: ‘to pass on
from the astronomy of the different planets, and to attempt the natural history of their
animal and vegetable kingdoms’.
46
Chambers asserted the afﬁnity between the globule
at the molecular level and the nebula at the cosmic. The universal forms, Chambers
claimed, were able to produce worlds and life: ‘analogy would lead us to conclude that
the combinations of the primordial matter, forming our so-called elements, are as
universal as to take place everywhere, as are the laws of gravitation and centrifugal
force’.
47
M.J.S. Hodge summarizes Chambers’ argument as one of completed
development: ‘Clearly [for Chambers], just as all celestial bodies are more or less
perfected and developed nebulae, so all animals and plants are more or less developed
43. Charles Wyclliffe Goodwin, ‘Mosaic Cosmogony’, in Essays and Reviews: The 1860 Text
and Its Reading, ed. by Victor Shea and William Whitla (Charlottesville: University Press
of Virginia, 2000), pp. 345–386 (p. 366).
44. Proctor, Other Worlds, p. 1.
45. Murray, ‘Vestiges of the Phoenix’, p. 248.
46. Chalmers, Series of Discourses, pp. 72–73.
47. Robert Chambers,Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation (London: Routledge, 1890), p. 30.
Journal of Victorian Culture 439
globules’.
48
The absence of mammals on the Galapagos Islands, reported in Darwin’s
Voyage of the Beagle (1845), only reinforced Chambers’ idea of the programmatic
development of species hierarchies: it appeared to him that life evolved in similar
patterns on different parts of Earth, but that some places had not yet reached their
time for developing higher forms of life.
49
This heterogeneous development of species
in time and location was taken as a domestic version of how, analogy suggested, they
would develop on other planets also.
In Of the Plurality of Worlds (1853), Whewell applied his views on scientiﬁc
method to the question of plurality in response to the success of Chambers’ Vestiges
and to refute its conjectures of variant life forms developing on other planets;
50
his
concern was both methodological (asserting the proper and careful mode of inductive
reasoning over loose analogical conjectures), and also spiritual: ‘if Venus andMars also
have their inhabitants; if Saturn and Jupiter, globes so much larger than the earth, have
a proportional amount of population; may not man be neglected or overlooked? Is he
worthy to be regarded by the Creator of all?’
51
He did not reject parallelism between
the disciplines of geology and natural history (and their application to plurality), but
derived from them an anti-pluralist conclusion. He argued, in the chapter ‘The
Argument from Geology’, that human life, while divinely ordained, only occupied a
tiny fraction of Earth’s history as a planet, and likewise that life was as rare in the space
of the universe as it was in the time of Earth’s geological history. The decision to
engage one scientiﬁc discipline (geology) to police the pluralist inferences apparently
encouraged by another (natural history) should also be understood in light of
Whewell’s extensive writings on the inductive nature of scientiﬁc interpretation.
Personifying induction in female form, Whewell afﬁrmed that ‘she does more than
Observation, inasmuch as she not only collects facts, but catches some connexion or
relation among them’.
52
Induction might contain a creative process on the part of the
observer, but it was not the same as assuming from a single instance (the ﬂora and
fauna upon earth) that similar processes of life and evolution (species history) were
taking place on other planets.
Evolutionary theory, if applied to other planets, provoked the hypothesis of other
species forms, and challenged the special status of Earth that Chalmers declared
(at least until visual evidence of other life-forms existed). Whewell resisted these
extensions of theory by arguing that space and time contain vast realms of emptiness,
to which Earth and its inhabitants were a sacred exception. De Quincey’s reaction to
the apparent demystiﬁcation of the nebula and the expansion of space by powerful
telescopes may have been singular in the force of its imagery, but it was embedded in
48. M.J.S. Hodge, ‘The Universal Gestation of Nature: Chambers’ “Vestiges” and
“Explanations”’, Journal of the History of Biology, 5 (1972), 127–151 (p. 142).
49. Hodge, ‘Universal Gestation’, p. 148.
50. Crowe, Extraterrestrial Life, p. 267; Hodge, ‘Universal Gestation’, p. 139.
51. Whewell, Plurality of Worlds, p. 25.
52. Whewell, ‘Modern Science’, p. 379. For an extensive discussion of Whewell’s defence of
inductive reasoning, see Laura J. Snyder, Reforming Philosophy: A Victorian Debate on
Science and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), chap. 1.
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advances of astronomical instruments, and serves as an example of precisely the same
sort of extrapolation which Chalmers and Whewell warned against, and to which
professional astronomers were also subject. On seeing a draft of the article, Nichol
commented that to characterize the nebula as Memnon (the ﬁgure with the Assyrian
tiara) and Satan was ‘more worthy of one whom the moon has smitten, than of one
who gazes calmly upon the stars’.
53
The narrative of increasing scientiﬁc objectivity in
the nineteenth century is a familiar one, but the diverse participation in the plurality
debate showed the recurring tendency of amateurs and scientiﬁc popularizers to
respond to the lure of such fancies, as I will discuss in the next section. Following
Bernard Lightman and others, we should not simply discount these popular reﬂections
of scientiﬁc questions, and their absorption into ﬁction, as inconsequential to ‘proper’
science or the history of ideas.
54
Also, the increasingly empirical character of
information derived from new technologies such as the spectroscope can be seen to
have increased these speculative departures, and allowed for the boundaries between
scientiﬁc enquiry, historiographical reﬂection and literary elaborations to remain
porous.
III. Astral projection
Spectroscopy transformed astronomical knowledge by providing a means for
analysing the chemical composition of light-emitting objects. In 1859, Robert Bunsen
and Gustav Kirchoff published their ﬁrst paper announcing the application of
spectrum analysis to the telescope; in 1864 William Huggins published his paper on
the stellar spectra of ﬁxed stars, providing evidence for the ﬁrst time that celestial
bodies were made up of the same elements known on Earth, and that there seemed to
be evidence that some nebulae were gaseous and unresolvable. Huggins, in a lecture
delivered to the BAAS in 1866, declared the signiﬁcance of the new analysis, and at the
same time reinvigorated the interpretation of other planets as analogical to ours:
The new branch of astronomical science which spectrum analysis may be said to have
founded has for its object to extend the laws of terrestrial physics to the other phenomena
of the heavenly bodies, and it rests upon the now established fact that matter of a similar
nature common to that of the earth, and subject to laws similar to those which prevail
upon the earth, exists throughout the stellar universe.
55
The debate between the resolvers and anti-resolvers was effectively over and the
potentially inﬁnite task of categorizing stars according to their spectra began. Lorraine
Daston and Peter Galison ﬁnd the spectroscope representative of a new model for
53. Smith, ‘De Quincey’s Revisions’, p. 207.
54. Bernard V. Lightman, Victorian Popularizers of Science: Designing Nature for New
Audiences (Chicago, IL; University of Chicago Press, 2007); Martin Willis, Vision, Science,
and Literature, 1870–1920: Ocular Horizons (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2011).
55. William Huggins, ‘Results of Spectrum Analysis Applied to Heavenly Bodies’, in Essays
in Astronomy, ed. by Edward Singleton Holden (New York: D. Appleton, 1900),
pp. 363–390 (p. 366).
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scientiﬁc objectivity that arose in the late-nineteenth century, one which consisted of
‘a scientiﬁc self equipped with a stern and vigilant conscience, in need not just of
external training but also of a ﬁerce self-regulation’.
56
Thomas Chalmers would surely
have approved of this sentiment.
The effect of spectroscopy upon the plurality debate was not, however,
immediately to kill off speculations regarding the life and species-history of other
planets under a new regime of self-regulation. On the contrary, it brieﬂy reinforced the
validity of analogical reasoning as a means to hypothesize about the life and nature of
other planets which, it could now be claimed, were constituted of similar materials to
those on Earth. From around the mid-century onwards, astronomical science and
imagination responded to the idea of light as information: both as a signature of
material composition to be deciphered by the spectroscope, and as the visual record of
events from the past that would continue undiminished across space.
57
Lynda Nead
develops an argument that the enhanced powers of visualization afforded by the
telescopic photograph and the spectroscope encouraged the imagination of other, even
more powerful capacities for seeing; and that the pursuit of ever more advanced
technologies of visualization was connected to an interpretation of planets and stars as
‘gigantic projecting devices, throwing beams into outer space that bore entire histories
of worlds and civilizations’.
58
My interest is how telescopy and spectroscopy
encouraged the imagination of other worlds as counterparts of Earth, and stimulated
an intersubjectivity between worlds that was not passive but dynamic and reﬂexive.
Also, the message of spectrum analysis – that the universe was endlessly the same –
found its corresponding historiographical orientation in the assertion of repetition
rather than singularity and divine providence.
Richard Proctor joined the plurality debate in 1870 with Other Worlds Than Ours,
which soon ran to multiple reprintings. Proctor had established his credibility as an
astronomer with publications on technical and observational matters, but this and his
proliﬁc output as editor of the journal Knowledge meant that by the time of his death,
‘Proctor had become the most widely read astronomical popularizer in the English-
speaking world’.
59
The connection for Proctor between spectroscopy and the
imagination of other worlds was clear. He described the spectroscope as ‘a light-sifter’
enabling the astronomer ‘to learn the character of the orbs from which . . . light
proceeds’.
60
The rapidity with which analogical inferences from the spectroscope could
move beyond the data of material constitution is clear: ‘we see at once, that in all
probability the other planets are constituted in the same way’, and that ‘The
imagination suggests immediately the existence of arts and sciences, trades and
56. Daston and Galison, Objectivity, p. 122.
57. The subject is discussed in Lynda Nead, The Haunted Gallery: Painting, Photography, Film
C. 1900 (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 2007), chap. 6; James Emmott,
‘Parameters of Vibration, Technologies of Capture, and the Layering of Voices and Faces
in the Nineteenth Century’, Victorian Studies, 53 (2011), 468–478.
58. Nead, Haunted Gallery, p. 203.
59. Lightman, Victorian Popularizers, p. 299.
60. Proctor, Other Worlds, p. 37.
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manufactures, on that distant world’.
61
There was a desire to go beyond the visible
evidence and not only to assume the presence of life, but to render alien life-forms as
civilizations which may also be contemplating us.
When Proctor imagined a distant observer watching military–historical events
unfold onEarth, variant histories became conceivable: ‘We can imagine, for example, an
observer onNeptunewatching the battle ofWaterloo from the early dawnuntil the hour
when Napoleon’s heart was yet full of hope, and our great captain was watching with
ever-growing anxiety, as charge after charge threatened to destroy the squares onwhose
stedfastness [sic ] depended the fate of a continent’.
62
The interplanetary observation of
history was a thought exercise that allowed Proctor to imagine that events, even in the
past, could maintain the quality of contingency – that they might have been otherwise.
This recalls Chambers’ idea, to which Chalmers and Whewell were so opposed (before
and after the publication of the Vestiges respectively): the contemplation of life
developing out of the same materials and principles of formation as on Earth, but in
different circumstances and with different results. Tina Young Choi’s recent article
illustrates how evolutionary hypotheses around the mid-century also produced a
tendency towards historical alternatives; how the idea of contingent evolutionary
development encouraged the imagination of other worlds: ‘To ask the reader to consider
the point in branching between two alternatives, to envision that moment of
indeterminacy or indecision, even though that point might be in the past, is to invite a
reenactment of that divergence’.
63
The return suggested in Proctor to an anticipatory
moment, when historical outcomes hung in the balance, was achieved through
consideration of the time taken for light to reach remote parts of the universe.
64
The desire to project oneself into space and onto the surface of another celestial
bodywas written about in depth and detail by James Nasmyth and James Carpenter in
The Moon Considered as a Planet, a World, and a Satellite (1874). In a section titled
‘A Flight of Fancy’ they described the feelings of ‘a thoughtful telescopist – watching
the moon night after night’, and wrote that it is ‘almost inevitable . . . for such an
observer to identify himself so far with the object of his scrutiny, as sometimes to
become in thought a lunar being’.
65
This was a process that required imaginative
completion of the visual data of the earthbound telescopist, who through analogy
could confabulate a world whose reality-status was indeterminate:
61. Proctor, Other Worlds, pp. 44, 45.
62. Proctor, Other Worlds, p. 322.
63. Tina Young Choi, ‘Natural History’s Hypothetical Moments: Narratives of Contingency in
Victorian Culture’, Victorian Studies, 51 (2009), 275–297 (p. 288).
64. ‘Yet, while our Neptunian would thus have traced the progress of the battle from his
distant world, the conﬂict would in reality have been long since decided, the ﬁnal charge
of the British army accomplished, the Imperial Guard destroyed, Napoleon fugitive, and
the Prussians, who to the Neptunian would be seen still struggling through muddy roads
towards the ﬁeld of battle, would have been relentlessly pursuing the scattered army of
France.’ (Proctor, Other Worlds, p. 322)
65. James Nasmyth and James Carpenter, The Moon Considered as a Planet, a World and a
Satellite (London: John Murray, 1916), p. 257.
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There is an irresistible tendency in the mind to pass beyond the actually visible, and to ﬁll
in with what it knows must exist those accessory features and phenomena that are only
hidden from us by distance and by our peculiar point of view. Where the material eye is
bafﬂed, the clairvoyance of reason and analogy come to its aid.
66
The authors attempted to downplay the departure from the observed to the imaginary:
these features were ‘only hidden from us by distance and our peculiar point of view’,
and the exercise of ‘clairvoyance’ was legitimized through its attachment to ‘reason
and analogy’ – a phrasing which recalls, again, the prohibitions of Thomas Chalmers
– as does the chapter’s title, ‘A Flight of Fancy’. They went on to render in image and
text (to which Figure 3 and the quotation below refer) the experience of being seated
on a lunar crag and witnessing an eclipse of the sun by Earth:
At all parts where these conditions obtain, the lunar eclipse-observer would see the ring
of light around the black earth-globe brilliantly crimsoned; at other parts it would have
other shades of red and yellow, and the whole effect would be to make the grand earth-
ball, hanging in the lunar sky, like a dark sphere in a circle of glittering gold and rubies.
67
The observation of sublime aesthetics in space, and of oneself as witness to this alien
scenery, could produce a type of anxiety very different from theological uncertainty; it
made space lonely. The ‘dreary, desolate grandeur’ with which Nasmyth and Carpenter
invested the lunar landscape was illustrative of a pattern in late nineteenth-century
astronomical writing which will now be discussed: of thinking of the cosmos as
uncomprehending and comfortless.
68
Nicholas Camille Flammarion described the imaginative delights stimulated by the
light of planets in 1880 in a strikingly similar way to Nasmyth and Carpenter: ‘Where is
the thoughtful mind that can see without admiration the brilliant Jupiter, accompanied
by his four satellites, entering the ﬁeld of a telescope inundated with its light, or the
splendid Saturn moving along surrounded by his mysterious ring, or a double sun
scarlet and sapphire, revealing itself in the midst of the inﬁnite night?’
69
Flammarion
would later found the Socie
´
te
´
Astronomique de France in 1887 and manage its journal;
like Proctor, his output was enormous and included both technical and popular works.
His lively interest in Spiritism as a branch of science extended his range beyond that of
Proctor, however, and his speculations were explored in works on subjects such as the
end of the world and the voyages of celestial beings.
70
In Lumen (1872), a dialogue
between two celestial spirits named Lumen and Quarens, Flammarion presented a less
celebratory account of the pleasures of astronomy. The reader learned that the soul
66. Nasmyth and Carpenter, Moon Considered, pp. 257–58.
67. Nasmyth and Carpenter, Moon Considered, p. 266.
68. Nasmyth and Carpenter, Moon Considered, p. 274.
69. Camille Flammarion, Popular Astronomy: A General Description of the Heavens, trans. by
John Ellard Gore (London: Chatto & Windus, 1907), p. 676.
70. Spiritism was proposed by Allan Kardec as a more precise term than ‘spiritualism’,
described in 1857 as the study of ‘the relation of the material world with spirits, or the
beings of the invisible world’ (Allan Kardec, Spiritualist Philosophy: The Spirits’ Book,
trans. by Anna Blackwell (Boston, MA: Colby and Rich, 1875), p. i).
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continued after corporeal death, and that cosmic metempsychosis allowed us to live
many lives on different planets before being released as pure spirit; this spiritist claim
foregrounded the idea of sameness and repetition rather than difference:
It seemed to me that I had already experienced it . . . . The spectre of Brocken did not
seem new to me. It was that I had already lived in analogous regions on the planet in
Virgo. The same life, the same actions, the same circumstances, the same conditions.
Analogies, analogies! Almost everything I had seen, done, thought on Earth, I had already
seen, done, thought one hundred years before on the earlier world.
71
The spectre of Brocken (which we have already seen referred to in De Quincey, and
which appears also in Goethe’s Faust) was a ﬁtting example of experience repeated on
multiple worlds, consisting as it did of an image of oneself cast outwards into space
when illuminated in the right atmospheric conditions. Also notable in the passage is
the suggestion of exhaustion or desolation at the prospect of a repeating series of
incarnations with equivalent or similar experiences. The junior spirit and narrator,
Quarens, is overwhelmed with the information he receives from Lumen and the book
ends on a note of despair at the inﬁnity of time, which is now fully apparent to the
initiate. Quarens has the ﬁnal words of the text as he considers the consequences of
never-ending, disembodied existence: ‘Eternal life! . . . without . . . possible . . . end!
Figure 3. ‘Aspect of an Eclipse of the Sun by the Earth’, James Nasmyth and James Carpenter.
Nasmyth and Carpenter, The Moon, frontispiece.
71. Flammarion, Lumen, p. 121. All quotations from Lumen are my own translation.
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I repeated, searching to comprehend, and feeling my brain melt in its skull . . . Ah! . . .
And I fell as falls a dead man!’
72
The bitter conception of the universe as constituted by
sameness (a notion supported by the discoveries of spectroscopy), and a secular, lonely
vision of eternity, implied a corresponding conception of our planet’s history in an
uncomprehending and indifferent universe; Richard Proctor conceded, in a lecture
delivered in 1874, that the contemplation of Earth’s future history ‘is like looking beyond
death; for now imagination presents our earth to us as an inert mass, not only lifeless as
at the beginning, but no longer possessing that potentiality of life which existed in her
substance before life appeared upon her surface’.
73
It was not surprising that astronomy,
and plurality in particular, were drawn upon for the ﬁgures with which to challenge a
conception of history predicated on the technological progress of modernity.
IV. Astral history
Louis Auguste Blanqui wrote L’E
´
ternite
´
par les astres at the age of 66, having been
sentenced to life imprisonment by the Thiers government for political agitation (as he
had been by every French government since 1830). A committed plotter, he was seized
only days before the insurrection in Paris of March 1871. The Communards are said to
have offered an exchange of all their prisoners for Blanqui – an offer which Thiers
refused.
74
He was released from prison in 1879 and died in 1881 of a stroke after
delivering a public speech on the need for an amnesty for the Communards. His absence
from the Commune, which hemight have led to a different outcome, has to be treated as
a formative context of his astronomical hypothesis of the fulﬁlment of every historical
outcome on the inﬁnite worlds contained in the universe. Its thrust, however, was not a
claim that the revolution would be fulﬁlled elsewhere. Instead, his hypothesis was one of
material eternity, and the impossibility of believing in the concept of progress in a
universe inwhich, according to science, every historical outcome had already taken place.
None of the existing critical commentaries on L’E
´
ternite
´
par les astres considers it as
an intervention in the plurality debate, in which it clearly participated. Blanqui
claimed that his conclusions were drawn from Laplace’s nebular hypothesis and the
discoveries of spectroscopy; he assumed from the evidence of the latter (the universal
presence of the same elements) that the number of these elements was ﬁnite. This view
of equivalent planetary constitution was accompanied by an idea of eternal recurrence.
Time was assumed to be inﬁnite, and Blanqui inferred a common interpretation of
planetary life-cycles according to which each celestial body underwent a process
beginning with birth as a star, followed by cooling and a period of stability, then
disintegration until the next collision restarted the process. This went on eternally, in
an inﬁnity of time, and was a reiteration of the material eternity of particles that
72. Flammarion, Lumen, p. 225.
73. Richard Anthony Proctor, ‘The Past and Future of Our Earth’, in Essays in Astronomy, ed.
by Edward Singleton Holden (New York: D. Appleton, 1900), pp. 55–82 (p. 79).
74. Alan B. Spitzer, The Revolutionary Theories of Louis Auguste Blanqui, Studies in the Social
Sciences/Columbia University (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), p. 13. Thiers
reportedly replied that Blanqui was worth more than an entire battalion.
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Flammarion asserted in Lumen (‘an arrangement of material molecules constantly
renewing themselves’
75
). Blanqui’s account of planetary formation is notable for its
linguistic and imagistic richness:
When, after millions of centuries, one of these immense eddies of stars – having been
born and now swirling around, dead together – is able to cover the open regions of space
before it, then its borders will collide with other extinguished whirlpools arriving at the
encounter. They will then enter into a furious me
ˆ
le
´
e that goes on for countless years on a
battleﬁeld that stretches across billions and billions of leagues. This part of the universe is
then little more than a vast atmosphere of ﬂames, unrelentingly furrowed by the
cataclysm’s lightning bolts, that instantly volatilize both stars and planets.
76
This account of bodies colliding and initiating an era of chaotic rebirth was of course a
description of the nebular formation of planets. It also projected a violent conﬂict into
the heavens, one which was revolutionary in the word’s two principal meanings as
both cyclical and tumultuous. Jacques Rancie
`
re argues that Blanqui’s cosmogony was
political, for it belonged to his political demand that an equivalent re-imagination of
universal processes take place on Earth.
77
Thus, advances in astronomy enabled a
mechanical vision of the heavens that supplanted prior descriptions of celestial order
called upon to authorize stable and hierarchical systems of government which
privileged stability and ﬁxed relations between constituent elements. Of ‘stability and
security’, in politics or the cosmos, ‘the experience of centuries and the universal
testimony vigorously reject such hallucinations as these’.
78
Another demystiﬁcation was theological: eternity and resurrection could now be
understood in material terms but with no consolatory power. Earth was in the
condition of a stable but moribund planet after its life as a star and prior to its
disintegration into its comet phase of interplanetary dust. Our planet was said to have
no long-term future, being bound by physical laws to descend eventually into eternal
night and barrenness. Humankind would possess a hospitable planet only for long
enough to develop a primitive knowledge of the physical nature of the stars.
79
Given
this implacable law of destruction, humans, in an inﬁnite universe, were obliged to
accept a view of planetary rebirth: ‘Either there is resurrection of stars, or universal
death’.
80
This statement wrested the concept of resurrection from a Christian context
while maintaining its tropes: dead planets dwell in ‘the night’s entombment’ until ‘the
moment will come when their ﬂame will again ﬂash up like lightning’.
81
Eternity and
resurrection became divorced from a Christian narrative of salvation by being
rendered, Blanqui claimed, perfectly intelligible as physical processes by modern
75. Flammarion, Lumen, p. 6.
76. Blanqui, ‘Eternity’, p. 25.
77. Jacques Rancie
`
re, ‘Preface’, in L’e
´
ternite
´
par les astres, Nouv. e
´
d. (Paris: Impressions
nouvelles, 2002), pp. 7–26 (p. 10).
78. Blanqui, ‘Eternity’, p. 32.
79. Blanqui, ‘Eternity’, p. 10.
80. Blanqui, ‘Eternity’, p. 33.
81. Blanqui, ‘Eternity’, p. 24.
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science. Planetary history, knowledge of which was derived from the analysis of light,
was made entirely material. Eternity degraded to sempiternity, resurrection to a
process of cyclical renewal which was inimical to, not protective of, life and progress.
The fate of the earth, like all planets, was to become a ‘ﬂoating grave’.
82
Blanqui
concluded with a cosmology which was felt as repetition both on the planetary level
(‘The same monotony and the same apathy even in the foreign stars’
83
) and also for
individuals:
What I write at this moment in the dungeons of the Fort du Taureau I will have written
for eternity, on a table, with a pen, in my clothes, in circumstances that are completely
alike. And so it is, for each.
84
There was the perception of a disturbing equivalence of our world and others –
present in Nasmyth and Carpenter’s imagination of lunar counterparts, more explicit
in Flammarion’s notion of repeated experience, and which found its most extreme
expression in L’E
´
ternite
´
par les astres. Blanqui’s declaration against cultural
improvement (‘there’s no progress!’
85
) was, crucially, dependent upon the
achievements of a technologically advanced culture, one in which academic disciplines
were becoming increasingly professionalized and governed by scientiﬁc values. Walter
Benjamin recognized this when he wrote of Blanqui’s hypothesis that: ‘taking his data
from the mechanistic natural science of bourgeois society, . . . it is simultaneously the
most terrible indictment of a society that projects this image of the cosmos –
understood as an image of itself – across the heavens’.
86
The illustration by ‘J. J.’ Grandville (Figure 4) satirized the same technological self-
satisfaction that was the object of Blanqui’s astronomical thesis; it was also included
and commented on by Benjamin in The Arcades Project. Grandville’s caricature was
aimed, surely, at a belief in the universal application of modern engineering, and its
capacities to transform all space as it had the cities of the western world.
This domesticating and bourgeois perspective on the universality of a phase of culture
was the object of Blanqui’s critique also, but rather than comic exaggeration, he
punctured complacent worldviews through a materialist account of eternity and
monotonous repetition. He alerted his readers to the topicality of his thesis at
moments in the text: while discussing the composition of stars, for example, he
commented that hydrogen and oxygen were the two elements which illuminated the
82. Ibid.
83. Blanqui, ‘Eternity’, p. 59.
84. Blanqui, ‘Eternity’, p. 57.
85. Ibid.
86. Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, ed. by Rolf Tiedemann, trans. by Howard Eiland
and Kevin McLaughlin (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1999), p. 112. This conjunction
of these critics of modernity was perceived by Benjamin, who planned a work on
Baudelaire in which a section, to be titled ‘The Commodity as Poetic Object’, would
examine Blanqui and Nietzsche together: Walter Benjamin, Selected Writings, ed. by
Michael William Jennings and Howard Eiland, 4 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press,
2003), IV, 94n.
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universe ‘as they illuminate the streets of Paris and London’ – an equivalence also
present in Grandville’s portrayal of the globular streetlamps among the stars and
planets.
87
Comets, Blanqui compared with two cultural ﬁgures of the nineteenth
century: vampires and ‘pallid Bohemians’.
88
He directed his verdict of universal
repetition and monotony to ‘men of the nineteenth century’ and chose as the emblem
of material eternity the particularities of fashion: ‘The number of our twins is inﬁnite
in time and space . . . . These twins are ﬂesh and bone, in pants and jackets, in crinoline
and chignon. These are hardly phantoms, rather the contemporary made eternal.’
89
Nebulae, fashion and contemporary culture were articulated by Benjamin when he
wrote that
. . . it is precisely in this century, the most parched and imagination-starved, that the
collective dream energy of a society has taken refuge with redoubled vehemence in the
mute impenetrable nebula of fashion, where the understanding cannot follow.
90
Nietzsche’s use of astral ﬁgures to lambast the complacency of modern culture
establishes him as an interlocutor of Blanqui – even if their shared interest in eternal
recurrence was coincidental.
91
The historiographical aspect of thismodern complacency
was clear to Nietzsche as it was to Blanqui. In his ﬁrst ‘Untimely Meditation’ (‘David
Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer’), he identiﬁed the dangers that afﬂicted German
culture in the aftermath of military victory over France. These included an automatic
Figure 4. ‘Le Pont des planets’ (‘Interplanetary Bridge’). Engraving by J. J. Grandville, 1844.
Laure Garcin, ed., J. J. Grandville: Revolutionnaire et Precurseur de L’art Du Mouvement (Paris:
Eric Losfeld, 1970), p. 171.
87. Blanqui, ‘Eternity’, p. 9.
88. Blanqui, ‘Eternity’, p. 16.
89. Blanqui, ‘Eternity’, p. 57.
90. Benjamin, Arcades Project, p. 64.
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and unreﬂecting homage to the ‘classics’, which led to the self-satisﬁed view that culture
had already produced its greatest treasures and that ‘all seeking is at an end’.
92
The
historiographical dimension to his attack on contemporary knowledge appeared in the
second meditation. There was not only the well-known characterization of the modern
enquirer into history as an ‘idler in the garden of knowledge’;
93
he built amore sustained
critique of the ‘excess of history’ (understood as a ‘malady’), which referred to the
extension of historical knowledge into all areas of life.
94
This recalls Foucault’s
characterization of the century as the one whose ‘great obsession’ was history,
95
but for
Nietzsche the proliferation of the historical sense took knowledge of the past beyond the
mental capacities of individuals: ‘[history] will not be viewed as a whole at all by that
inﬁnitesimal atom, the individual man’, and will lead only to ‘stupefaction’.
96
What then, did Nietzsche mean when he declared that the ‘constellation of life and
history’ had been profoundly altered by the interposition of ‘a gleaming and glorious
star’ – that is ‘by science, by the demand that history should be a science’;
97
and was his
choice of the astral ﬁgure signiﬁcant? We should pay attention to the reversal of the
relationship between truth and visibility that has been common to the writers
discussed so far: notwithstanding the role of the imagination or deliberately ﬁctive
accounts, astronomers consistently made observations of the stars the basis for
conclusions about the nature of the universe – whether those conclusions were
speculative departures from such observations or not. The Moon Hoax pretended to
be the descriptions of the enhanced views made possible by a new generation of
telescope; Lord Rosse’s telescope seemed to have solved the nebular debate, and the
data of spectroscopy encouraged Proctor to imagine other counterpart worlds;
arguments about intelligent life on Mars hinged on whether Schiaparelli’s
interpretation of lunar observations was correct. Even Chalmers was prepared to
concede other civilizations in the universe if visible evidence could be produced.
A conception of history was pushed outwards into space, with conjectural beliefs and
anxious reservations attending the development of instruments of seeing.
Nietzsche was thus taking a typically countervailing stance by ﬁguring the
‘demand’ that history be scientiﬁc as a celestial body which had ‘interposed’ itself and
altered the ‘constellation’ of life and history. A star therefore stood as an obstruction to
the perception of constellations – which were themselves the projection of heroic-
mythic narratives and symbols into the cosmos; those myths afﬁrmed the centrality of
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Meditations, ed. by Charles Taylor, trans. by R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1983), pp. 1–56 (p. 10).
93. Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, ‘On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life’, in
Untimely Meditations, ed. by Charles Taylor, trans. by R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 57–125 (p. 59).
94. Nietzsche, ‘On the Uses’, pp. 64, 120.
95. Michel Foucault, ‘Of Other Spaces’, in The Visual Culture Reader, 2nd ed. (London:
Routledge, 2002), pp. 229–236 (p. 229).
96. Nietzsche, ‘On the Uses’, p. 101; Nietzsche, ‘David Strauss’, p. 11 (original emphasis).
97. Nietzsche, ‘On the Uses’, p. 77 (original emphasis).
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man to the universe, and they were dispelled by the facts of positional astronomy.
Man’s greatest exploits no longer have the stars as their archive or index (Nietzsche’s
laments require the masculine), and in precisely the same way history has been
transformed so that it no longer serves this purpose either. In a splendidly aphoristic
twist, Nietzsche wrote that it was not that history was insufﬁciently valued, but that
the elevation of history as an ever-accumulating, total ﬁeld of knowledge had
impoverished mankind: ‘it is possible to value the study of history to such a degree
that life becomes stunted and degenerate.’
98
Once extended back towards the earliest
origins, history became ‘the science of universal becoming’.
99
Heroic events could now
be thought of in materialist terms, and no longer conﬁned to single iterations.
‘whenever the stars stand in a certain relation to one another a Stoic again joins with
an Epicurean to murder Caesar, and when they stand in another relation Columbus
will again discover America’.
100
The achievements of science involved another
reversion, for the information of astronomical science would introduce an age ‘when
the astronomers have again become astrologers’.
101
By imagining multiple iterations of human history on Earth, Nietzsche was not
stating the existence of a plurality of worlds, but his vision of an endless repetition of
history among the inﬁnities of space and time draws him into close afﬁnity with
Blanqui’s pluralism. It was likewise derived from a model of scientiﬁc enquiry which
set itself the task of cataloguing the inﬁnite range and history of a material universe;
and for Nietzsche this model was then applied to human history on Earth. The
astronomers discussed in this article (Whewell, Nasmyth and Carpenter, Proctor)
strained their eyes to reach conclusions for or against plurality from the evidence of
light transmissions which, if observers had sufﬁciently enhanced eyes or appropriate
instruments, must contain the truths of the universe and its history. Nietzsche saw the
‘gleaming and glorious’ light of stars and science as one which dazzled and obscured
useful knowledge, and despite the wilful perversity of his conclusions his decision to
make light central to the debate about the role of man and human history in a material
universe was not untimely at all.
V. Conclusion: hidden things
How then are those hidden things to be revealed? How, for example, are we to lay hold of
the physical basis of light, since, like that of life itself, it lies entirely without the domain of
the senses?
102
John Tyndall asked these questions in a lecture titled ‘On the Scientiﬁc Use of the
Imagination’ (1870). He established a delicately balanced position which acknowl-
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edged the implications of astronomical science (afﬁrmed by spectrum analysis
103
) and
the theory of ‘Natural Evolution’: that as well as the lower and higher animal forms,
‘the human mind itself – emotion, intellect, will, and all their phenomena – were once
latent in a ﬁery cloud’.
104
He still declared, however, that the mystery of creation
remained ‘untouched’: ‘For granting the nebula and its potential life, the question,
whence came they? would still remain to bafﬂe and bewilder us’.
105
This was a
reiteration of a point made by Whewell, also on the nebular theory’s account of
planetary formation: ‘Do we not, far more than ever, require an origin of this origin?’
he asked in 1833.
106
Like Chalmers’ earlier mapping of the limits of scientiﬁc
propriety, this insistence on the resilience of mystery to scientiﬁc enquiry posited an
ineffable boundary between what could be known by man through observation and
scientiﬁc theory, and what must remain a source of wonder. By compressing these
questions, however, into the examination of light, Tyndall directed us towards the
paradox that persisted through the plurality of worlds debate. Light, the condition of
visibility, also stimulated the mind to conjecture what remained invisible: the life of
the stars and planets which were too far to discern, or the observers of our solar system
to whose superhuman vision our history was arriving as light. For light, once it
promised the key to Earth’s material formation, as well as its history, became a
medium for spatially expanded historical reﬂection in an age in which new sciences
were supplanting scriptural accounts of humans’ origins in the universe. In Lumen, the
junior spirit Quarens asks his mentor to describe the earliest history, when Earth was a
terrestrial paradise, and is dismayed to learn that no such period existed, but rather
one in which giant monsters fought each other.
107
The pursuit of light by science was
one which posed questions of material historical origins – and led to assertions of
unseen monsters and beings. The plurality debate, although impelled by science, is
best understood as a battle between two sets of historical imaginaries, and eventually a
transition from one to the other. Both of these were ‘entirely without the domain of
the senses’.
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